| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w19998 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 19998 |
| Risk Adjustment of Health Plan Payments to Correct Inefficient Plan Choice from Adverse Selection | |
| Jacob Glazer; Thomas McGuire; Julie Shi | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops and implements a statistical methodology to account for the equilibrium effects (aka adverse selection) in design of risk adjustment formula in health insurance markets. Our setting is modeled on the situation in Medicare and the new state Exchanges where individuals sort themselves between a discrete set of plan types (here, two). Our "Silver" and "Gold" plans have fixed characteristics, as in the well-known research on selection and efficiency by Einav and Finkelstein (EF). We build on the EF model in several respects, including by showing that risk adjustment can be used to achieve the premiums that will lead to efficient sorting. The target risk adjustment weights can be found by use of constrained regressions, where the constraints in the estimation are conditions on premiums that should be satisfied in equilibrium. We illustrate implementation of the method with data from seven years of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w19998 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577672 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacob Glazer,Thomas McGuire,Julie Shi. Risk Adjustment of Health Plan Payments to Correct Inefficient Plan Choice from Adverse Selection. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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