G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20008
来源IDWorking Paper 20008
On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments
John List; Daan Van Soest; Jan Stoop; Haiwen Zhou
发表日期2014-03-27
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Both private and public organizations constantly grapple with incentive schemes to induce maximum effort from agents. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory reveals a critical link between the distribution of luck and the number of contestants. We find that if there is considerable (little) mass on good draws, equilibrium effort is an increasing (decreasing) function of the number of contestants. Our first test of the theory implements a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed. We complement our lab experiment with a field experiment, where we rely on biological models complemented by economic models to inform us of the relevant theoretical predictions. In both cases we find that the theory has a fair amount of explanatory power, allowing a deeper understanding of how to effectively design tournaments. From a methodological perspective, our study showcases the benefits of combining data from both lab and field experiments to deepen our understanding of the economic science.
主题Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; Public Goods
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20008
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577682
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
John List,Daan Van Soest,Jan Stoop,et al. On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments. 2014.
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