| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20011 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20011 |
| Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining | |
| S. Nageeb Ali; B. Douglas Bernheim; Xiaochen Fan | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition procedure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance, then irrespective of how patient the individual legislators are, Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer. We also examine the extent to which alternative bargaining protocols can limit the concentration of power. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20011 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577685 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | S. Nageeb Ali,B. Douglas Bernheim,Xiaochen Fan. Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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