| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20015 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20015 |
| Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market | |
| Sumit Agarwal; Gene Amromin; Itzhak Ben-David; Souphala Chomsisengphet; Yan Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20015 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577689 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sumit Agarwal,Gene Amromin,Itzhak Ben-David,et al. Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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