| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20034 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20034 |
| Structuring Incentives Within Organizations: The Case of Accountable Care Organizations | |
| Brigham Frandsen; James B. Rebitzer | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are new organizations created by the Affordable Care Act to encourage more efficient, integrated care delivery. To promote efficiency, ACOs sign contracts under which they keep a fraction of the savings from keeping costs below target provided they also maintain quality levels. To promote integration and facilitate measurement, ACOs are required to have at least 5,000 enrollees and so must coordinate across many providers. We calibrate a model of optimal ACO incentives using proprietary performance measures from a large insurer. Our key finding is that free-riding is a severe problem and causes optimal incentive payments to exceed cost savings unless ACOs simultaneously achieve extremely large efficiency gains. This implies that successful ACOs will likely rely on motivational strategies that amplify the effects of under-powered incentives. These motivational strategies raise important questions about the limits of ACOs as a policy for promoting more efficient, integrated care. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20034 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577708 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brigham Frandsen,James B. Rebitzer. Structuring Incentives Within Organizations: The Case of Accountable Care Organizations. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
