| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20043 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20043 |
| Capital Taxation under Political Constraints | |
| Florian Scheuer; Alexander Wolitzky | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, credible policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. If the only credible reform threat is to fully equalize consumption, we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the middle class but are taxed for the poor and rich. If ex post the government may strategically propose a reform other than full equalization in order to secure additional political support, then optimal capital taxes are instead progressive throughout the income distribution. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20043 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577717 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Scheuer,Alexander Wolitzky. Capital Taxation under Political Constraints. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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