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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20048
来源IDWorking Paper 20048
The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Hunt Allcott; Richard Sweeney
发表日期2014-04-10
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. While a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information at more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that at current prices in this context, seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy efficiency investments. We theoretically and empirically explore the novel policy option of combining customer subsidies with government-provided sales incentives.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20048
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577722
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GB/T 7714
Hunt Allcott,Richard Sweeney. The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2014.
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