G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20074
来源IDWorking Paper 20074
Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification
Daniel Elfenbein; Raymond Fisman; Brian McManus
发表日期2014-04-24
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Quality certification programs help consumers to identify high-quality products or sellers in markets with information asymmetries. Using data from eBay UK's online marketplace, we study how certification's impact on consumer demand varies with market- and seller-level attributes, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in sellers' certification status. The positive effects of eBay's "top rated seller" certification are stronger for categories with relatively few other certified sellers, in more competitive markets, and for sellers with shorter records of past performance. These findings indicate certification provides its greatest value when certification is rare, the product space is crowded, and for sellers lacking established reputations.
主题Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20074
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577748
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Daniel Elfenbein,Raymond Fisman,Brian McManus. Market Structure, Reputation, and the Value of Quality Certification. 2014.
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