G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20109
来源IDWorking Paper 20109
When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation
Steve Cicala
发表日期2014-05-08
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal- and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas), and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20109
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577782
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Steve Cicala. When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation. 2014.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Steve Cicala]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Steve Cicala]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Steve Cicala]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。