| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20109 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20109 |
| When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation | |
| Steve Cicala | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-05-08 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper evaluates changes in fuel procurement practices by coal- and gas-fired power plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation of electricity generation. I find that deregulated plants substantially reduce the price paid for coal (but not gas), and tend to employ less capital-intensive sulfur abatement techniques relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change. Deregulation also led to a shift toward more productive coal mines. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information, capital bias, and regulatory capture as important sources of regulatory distortion. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20109 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577782 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steve Cicala. When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation. 2014. |
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