| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20114 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20114 |
| Health, Disability Insurance and Retirement in Denmark | |
| Paul Bingley; Nabanita Datta Gupta; Michael Jorgensen; Peder Pedersen | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-05-08 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There are large differences in labor force participation rates by health status. We examine to what extent these differences are determined by the provisions of Disability Insurance and other pension programs. Using administrative data for Denmark we find that those in worse health and with less schooling are more likely to receive DI. The gradient of DI participation across health quintiles is almost twice as steep as for schooling - moving from having no high school diploma to college completion. Using an option value model that accounts for different pathways to retirement, applied to a period spanning a major pension reform, we find that pension program incentives in general are important determinants of retirement age. Individuals in poor health and with low schooling are significantly more responsive to economic incentives than those who are in better health and with more schooling. Similar gradients in outcomes and behavior by health and schooling partially reflects the less educated having poorer health on average, but also that the less educated have worse job prospects and higher replacement rates due to a progressive formula for DI and other pension benefits. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20114 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577787 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Bingley,Nabanita Datta Gupta,Michael Jorgensen,et al. Health, Disability Insurance and Retirement in Denmark. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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