G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20127
来源IDWorking Paper 20127
When Consumers Do Not Make an Active Decision: Dynamic Default Rules and their Equilibrium Effects
Keith M. Marzilli Ericson
发表日期2014-05-15
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Dynamic defaults for recurring purchases determine what happens to consumers enrolled in a product or service who take no action at a decision point. Consumers may face automatic renewal, automatic switching, or non-purchase defaults. Privately optimal dynamic defaults depend on the contributions of adjustment costs versus psychological factors leading to inaction: both produce inertia under renewal defaults, but differ under non-renewal defaults. Defaults have equilibrium effects on pricing by changing the elasticity of repeat demand. Socially optimal defaults depend on firms' pricing responses as well; more elastic repeat demand restrains price increases on repeat customers and can reduce inefficient switching.
主题Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20127
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577801
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Keith M. Marzilli Ericson. When Consumers Do Not Make an Active Decision: Dynamic Default Rules and their Equilibrium Effects. 2014.
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