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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w20176 |
来源ID | Working Paper 20176 |
Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices | |
Stephen G. Dimmock; William C. Gerken; Zoran Ivković; Scott J. Weisbenner | |
发表日期 | 2014-05-29 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Because of differences in accrued gains and investors' tax-sensitivity, capital gains "lock-in" varies across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Using this variation, we show that tax lock-in affects funds' governance decisions. Higher tax lock-in decreases the likelihood a fund sells a stock prior to contentious votes, and increases the likelihood the fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivations, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. High aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predicts a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20176 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577849 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen G. Dimmock,William C. Gerken,Zoran Ivković,et al. Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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