G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20176
来源IDWorking Paper 20176
Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices
Stephen G. Dimmock; William C. Gerken; Zoran Ivković; Scott J. Weisbenner
发表日期2014-05-29
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Because of differences in accrued gains and investors' tax-sensitivity, capital gains "lock-in" varies across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Using this variation, we show that tax lock-in affects funds' governance decisions. Higher tax lock-in decreases the likelihood a fund sells a stock prior to contentious votes, and increases the likelihood the fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivations, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. High aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predicts a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
主题Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20176
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577849
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Stephen G. Dimmock,William C. Gerken,Zoran Ivković,et al. Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices. 2014.
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