| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20192 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20192 |
| A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks | |
| Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-05 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The government often provides relief against large risks, such as disasters. A simple, general rationale for this role of government is considered here that applies even when private contracting to share risks is not subject to market imperfections. Specifically, the optimal private sharing of risks will not result in complete coverage against them when they are sufficiently large. Hence, when such risks eventuate, the marginal utility to individuals of governmental relief may exceed the marginal value of public goods. Consequently, social welfare may be raised if the government reduces public goods expenditures and directs these freed resources toward individuals who have suffered losses. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20192 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577866 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Shavell. A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks. 2014. |
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