| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20197 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20197 |
| Market Outcomes and Dynamic Patent Buyouts | |
| Alberto Galasso; Matthew Mitchell; Gabor Virag | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-05 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Patents are a useful but imperfect reward for innovation. In sectors like pharmaceuticals, where monopoly distortions seem particularly severe, there is growing international political pressure to identify alternatives to patents that could lower prices. Innovation prizes and other non-patent rewards are becoming more prevalent in government's innovation policy, and are also widely implemented by private philanthropists. In this paper we develop a model in which a patent buyout is effective, using information from market outcomes as a guide to the payment amount. We allow for the fact that sales may be manipulable by the innovator in search of the buyout payment, and show that in a wide variety of cases the optimal policy in our model still involves some form of patent buyout. The buyout uses two key pieces of information: market outcomes observed during the patent's life, and the competitive outcome after the patent is bought out. We show that such dynamic market information can be effective at determining both marginal and total willingness to pay of consumers in many important cases, and therefore can generate the right innovation incentives in our model. |
| 主题 | Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20197 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577870 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Galasso,Matthew Mitchell,Gabor Virag. Market Outcomes and Dynamic Patent Buyouts. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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