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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20216
来源IDWorking Paper 20216
The Dictator's Inner Circle
Patrick Francois; Ilia Rainer; Francesco Trebbi
发表日期2014-06-12
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We posit the problem of an autocrat who has to allocate access to the executive positions in his inner circle and define the career profile of his own insiders. Statically, granting access to an executive post to a more experienced subordinate increases political returns to the post, but is more threatening to the leader in case of a coup. Dynamically, the leader monitors the capacity of staging a coup by his subordinates, which grows over time, and the incentives of trading a subordinate's own position for a potential shot at the leadership, which defines the incentives of staging a palace coup for each member of the inner circle. We map these theoretical elements into structurally estimable hazard functions of terminations of cabinet ministers for a panel of postcolonial Sub-Saharan African countries. The hazard functions initially increase over time, indicating that most government insiders quickly wear out their welcome, and then drop once the minister is fully entrenched in the current regime. We argue that the survival concerns of the leader in granting access to his inner circle can cover much ground in explaining the widespread lack of competence of African governments and the vast heterogeneity of political performance between and within these regimes.
主题Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20216
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577889
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick Francois,Ilia Rainer,Francesco Trebbi. The Dictator's Inner Circle. 2014.
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