| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20241 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20241 |
| The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation | |
| David Lucca; Amit Seru; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-19 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper traces career transitions of federal and state U.S. banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae, and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door. We find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs, driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms. These worker flows are also driven by state-specific banking conditions as measured by local banks' profitability, asset quality and failure rates. The regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time, with shorter regulatory spells for workers, and especially those with higher education. Evidence from cross-state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows into regulation and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during periods of intense enforcement, though gross outflows are significantly smaller in magnitude. These results appear inconsistent with a "quid-pro-quo" explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a "regulatory schooling" hypothesis. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20241 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577914 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Lucca,Amit Seru,Francesco Trebbi. The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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