| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20255 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20255 |
| Banks as Secret Keepers | |
| Tri Vi Dang; Gary Gorton; Bengt Holmström; Guillermo Ordonez | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-26 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets - loans - not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects, needed for allocative efficiency. Intermediaries exist to hide such information, so banks select portfolios of information-insensitive assets. For the economy as a whole, firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market/stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20255 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577928 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tri Vi Dang,Gary Gorton,Bengt Holmström,et al. Banks as Secret Keepers. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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