全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w20259
来源ID	Working Paper 20259
	Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field
	Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Cynthia Kinnan; Horacio Larreguy
发表日期	2014-06-26
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	Absence of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social ties may aid cooperation, but agents vary in network centrality, and this hierarchy may hinder cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects' partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners' relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. Socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement; distant pairs do not. Pairs with unequal importance behave less cooperatively without enforcement. Thus capacity for cooperation depends on the underlying network.
主题	Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Households and Firms ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Other ; Culture
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w20259
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577932
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Arun G. Chandrasekhar,Cynthia Kinnan,Horacio Larreguy. Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field. 2014.