| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20261 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20261 |
| The Runner-Up Effect | |
| Santosh Anagol; Thomas Fujiwara | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-06-26 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Exploiting regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian, Indian, and Canadian first-past-the-post elections, we document that second-place candidates are substantially more likely than close third-place candidates to run in, and win, subsequent elections. Since both candidates lost the election and had similar electoral performance, this is the effect of being labeled the runner-up. We explore the potential mechanisms for this runner-up effect, including selection into candidacy, heuristic behavior by political actors, and the runner-up obtaining an advantage from strategic coordination (being more likely to become a focal point). Selection into candidacy is unlikely to explain the effect on winning subsequent elections, and the weight of evidence suggests the effect is driven by strategic coordination. We find no effect of finishing in third-place versus fourth-place. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20261 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577934 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Santosh Anagol,Thomas Fujiwara. The Runner-Up Effect. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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