| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20277 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20277 |
| Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions | |
| Mark Aguiar; Manuel Amador; Emmanuel Farhi; Gita Gopinath | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over borrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crises. We demonstrate that a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can credibly deliver low inflation. These findings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; International Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20277 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577951 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Aguiar,Manuel Amador,Emmanuel Farhi,et al. Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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