| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20315 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20315 |
| Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports | |
| Sylvain Chassang; Gerard Padró i Miquel | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event of an intervention. In this setting intervention policies that are very responsive to the monitor's message provide very informative signals to the agent, allowing him to shut down communication channels. Successful intervention policies must garble the information provided by monitors and cannot be fully responsive. We show that even if hard evidence is unavailable and monitors have heterogeneous incentives to (mis)report, it is possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple heuristic to calibrate intervention policies: first get monitors to complain, then scale up enforcement while keeping the information content of intervention constant. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20315 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577989 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvain Chassang,Gerard Padró i Miquel. Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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