| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20317 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20317 |
| The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market | |
| Hanming Fang; Quanlin Gu; Li-An Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using a large, unique dataset on the Chinese housing market, we propose to measure corruption using the price differences paid by bureaucrat buyers and non-bureaucrat buyers in the housing market. We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is on average 1.05 percentage points lower than non-bureaucrat buyers, after controlling for a full set of characteristics of buyers, houses and mortgage loans. More interestingly, we find that the bureaucrat price discounts exhibit interesting gradients with respect to their hierarchical ranks, the criticality of their government agencies to real estate developers, and geography. We argue that the bureaucrat price discounts and the gradients of these discounts are unlikely to be driven by alternative explanations, thus they are evidence of corruption and measures of the market value of government power. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20317 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577991 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hanming Fang,Quanlin Gu,Li-An Zhou. The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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