| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20321 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20321 |
| When Incentives Matter Too Much: Explaining Significant Responses to Irrelevant Information | |
| Thomas Ahn; Jacob L. Vigdor | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When economic agents make decisions on the basis of an information set containing both a continuous variable and a discrete signal based on that variable, theory suggests that the signal should have no bearing on behavior conditional on the variable itself. Numerous empirical studies, many based on the regression discontinuity design, have contradicted this basic prediction. We propose two models of behavior capable of rationalizing this observed behavior, one based on information acquisition costs and a second on learning and imperfect information. Using data on school responses to discrete signals embedded in North Carolina's school accountability system, we find patterns of results inconsistent with the first model but consistent with the second. These results imply that rational responses to policy interventions may take time to emerge; consequently evaluations based on short-term data may understate treatment effects. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20321 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577995 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Ahn,Jacob L. Vigdor. When Incentives Matter Too Much: Explaining Significant Responses to Irrelevant Information. 2014. |
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