| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w20361
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20361
|
| Supply vs. Demand under an Affirmative Action Ban: Estimates from UC Law Schools |
| Danny Yagan
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-31
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Affirmative action bans can reduce black enrollment not only by reducing black admission advantages (contracting demand) but also by reducing applications (contracting supply) from black students who can still gain admission but prefer alternative schools that still practice affirmative action. When affirmative action was banned at UC law schools, Berkeley's black applications and enrollment declined by almost half even as black admission rates rose relative to whites. I ask whether black enrollment at UC law schools would have markedly declined even without the supply contraction. I find in a large sample of students applying to law schools nationwide that black supply contractions were driven mostly or entirely by students unlikely to gain admission under the ban, yielding stronger post-ban black applicant pools. Holding applicant pools constant, I estimate that the ban reduced black admission rates at both Berkeley and UCLA by half. Hence, black enrollment at these elite schools would likely have plummeted even if supply contractions had been muted---as could occur under a nationwide ban that eliminates affirmative-action-practicing alternatives. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare
; Labor Economics
; Other
; Law and Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20361
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578034
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Danny Yagan. Supply vs. Demand under an Affirmative Action Ban: Estimates from UC Law Schools. 2014.
|
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