| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20365 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20365 |
| Inefficiently Low Screening with Walrasian Markets | |
| Kinda Hachem | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-07 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Financial intermediaries devote resources to finding and screening borrowers before lending capital. By retaining only sufficiently good matches, informed lenders exacerbate adverse selection problems for others lending in the same market. Failure to internalize this implies that informed lenders are too selective in the matches they retain. The resulting under-use of capital pushes the cost of capital down, decreasing the benefit of being informed rather than uninformed and prompting a reallocation of resources from screening to matching. Compared to the constrained efficient allocation, the decentralized equilibrium has too little screening, too little informed credit, and too much uninformed credit. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20365 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578038 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kinda Hachem. Inefficiently Low Screening with Walrasian Markets. 2014. |
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