| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20391 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20391 |
| Evidence for Relational Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending | |
| Peter Benczur; Cosmin L. Ilut | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a "punishment" effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities ("loss of reputation"). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries between 1973-1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20391 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578065 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Benczur,Cosmin L. Ilut. Evidence for Relational Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending. 2014. |
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