| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20416 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20416 |
| Entry and Exit in OTC Derivatives Markets | |
| Andrew G. Atkeson; Andrea L. Eisfeldt; Pierre-Olivier Weill | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-28 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium and socially optimal decisions of banks to enter, trade in, and possibly exit, an OTC market. Although we endow all banks with the same trading technology, banks’ optimal entry and trading decisions endogenously lead to a realistic market structure comprised of dealers and customers with distinct trading patterns. We decompose banks’ entry incentives into incentives to hedge risk and incentives to make intermediation profits. We show that dealer banks enter more than is socially optimal. In the face of large negative shocks, they may also exit more than is socially optimal when markets are not perfectly resilient. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20416 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578090 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew G. Atkeson,Andrea L. Eisfeldt,Pierre-Olivier Weill. Entry and Exit in OTC Derivatives Markets. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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