| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20417 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20417 |
| Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power | |
| Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frédéric Malherbe | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-08-28 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A group of agents wants to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We analyze a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power (Veto) - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in the EU institutions and could help to inform debates about policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20417 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578091 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Frédéric Malherbe. Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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