| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20456 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20456 |
| The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability | |
| Pierre Chaigneau; Alex Edmans; Daniel Gottlieb | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-05 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if these output realizations are accompanied by an unfavorable signal, the payment cannot fall further and so the principal cannot make use of the signal. Similarly, a principal with limited liability may be unable to increase payments after a favorable signal. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for signals to have positive value. Under bilateral limited liability and a monotone likelihood ratio, the value of information is non-monotonic in output, and the principal is willing to pay more for information at intermediate output levels. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20456 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578128 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Chaigneau,Alex Edmans,Daniel Gottlieb. The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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