| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20484 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20484 |
| The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting | |
| Michael R. Roberts | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using data from SEC filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers' credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20484 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578156 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael R. Roberts. The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael R. Roberts]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael R. Roberts]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Michael R. Roberts]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
