| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20487 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20487 |
| Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction | |
| Jonathan Levin; Andrzej Skrzypacz | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction and predation. These outcomes arise because of the way the auction separates allocation and pricing, so that bidders are asked to make decisions that cannot possibly affect their own auction outcome. Our results obtain in a standard homogenous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20487 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578159 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Levin,Andrzej Skrzypacz. Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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