| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20529 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20529 |
| The Impatient Salesperson and the Delegation of Pricing Authority | |
| Edward P. Lazear | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-09-25 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Sales agents are impatient relative to owners. If a good fails to sell, the owner still retains possession of that good and can enjoy its services, whereas the agent receives nothing. As a consequence, sales agents prefer a lower price than does an owner. Owners are therefore reluctant to delegate pricing authority to sales agents even when the agents have superior market information. Pricing authority is more likely to be delegated to agents when the owner lacks monopoly power and sells competitively and when the good is a non-durable. Agents who are given pricing authority are less likely to be paid commissions and more likely to be on a straight salary. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20529 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward P. Lazear. The Impatient Salesperson and the Delegation of Pricing Authority. 2014. |
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