| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20542 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20542 |
| The Value of Informativeness for Contracting | |
| Pierre Chaigneau; Alex Edmans; Daniel Gottlieb | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-06 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The informativeness principle demonstrates qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits -- and compare them against the costs of precision -- since we typically cannot solve for the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with informativeness. We consider a standard agency model with risk-neutrality and limited liability, where the optimal contract is a call option. The direct effect of reducing signal volatility is a fall in the value of the option, benefiting the principal. The indirect effect is a change in the agent's effort incentives. If the original option is sufficiently out-of-the-money, the agent can only beat the strike price if he exerts effort and there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in volatility reduces effort incentives. As the agency problem weakens, the gains from precision fall towards zero, potentially justifying pay-for-luck. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20542 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578216 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Chaigneau,Alex Edmans,Daniel Gottlieb. The Value of Informativeness for Contracting. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
