G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20570
来源IDWorking Paper 20570
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities
Alberto Alesina; Matteo Paradisi
发表日期2014-10-13
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 generated a natural experiment, which is useful to test political budget cycles, i.e. the strategic choice of fiscal variables in relation to elections. We do find substantial evidence of political budget cycles, with municipalities choosing lower tax rates when close to elections. We observe this budget cycle only for smaller municipalities where the tax was more likely to be the single most important issue for the local government. Cities close to elections with large deficits did not set lower rates before elections, probably because they felt the binding constraints of budget rules.
主题Public Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20570
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578245
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alberto Alesina,Matteo Paradisi. Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities. 2014.
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