| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20570 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20570 |
| Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities | |
| Alberto Alesina; Matteo Paradisi | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-13 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 generated a natural experiment, which is useful to test political budget cycles, i.e. the strategic choice of fiscal variables in relation to elections. We do find substantial evidence of political budget cycles, with municipalities choosing lower tax rates when close to elections. We observe this budget cycle only for smaller municipalities where the tax was more likely to be the single most important issue for the local government. Cities close to elections with large deficits did not set lower rates before elections, probably because they felt the binding constraints of budget rules. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20570 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578245 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Matteo Paradisi. Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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