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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20596
来源IDWorking Paper 20596
A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections
Ginger Zhe Jin; Jungmin Lee
发表日期2014-10-20
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要This paper examines the role of repetition in government regulation using Florida restaurant inspection data from 2003 to 2010. In the raw data, inspectors new to inspected restaurants tend to report 27% more violations than repeat inspectors. After ruling out regulatory capture and endogenous inspector rotation as potential explanations, we find that the new-repeat gap is best explained by the following two effects: first, restaurants target compliance in response to heterogenous stringency and tastes of different inspectors; second, inspectors pay greater attention in their first visit than in subsequent visits. After controlling for heterogenous inspector criteria, we find that a new inspector reports 13-18% more violations than the second visit of the previous inspector, likely due to a higher level of attention. Counterfactual simulations highlight the importance of inspector training and rotation in regulatory outcomes.
主题Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20596
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578270
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ginger Zhe Jin,Jungmin Lee. A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections. 2014.
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