| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20603 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20603 |
| The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States | |
| Kris James Mitchener; Matthew Jaremski | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use a novel data set spanning 1820-1910 to examine the origins of bank supervision and assess factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervision across U.S. states. We show that it took more than a century for the widespread adoption of independent supervisory institutions tasked with maintaining the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; History ; Macroeconomic History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20603 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578277 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kris James Mitchener,Matthew Jaremski. The Evolution of Bank Supervision: Evidence from U.S. States. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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