| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20623 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20623 |
| Markets with Multidimensional Private Information | |
| Veronica Guerrieri; Robert Shimer | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi- separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This multiplicity does not rely on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and so is not amenable to standard signaling game refinements. The semi- separating equilibrium may be not Pareto efficient, even if it is not Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium. Instead, efficient allocations may require transfers across uninformed buyers, inconsistent with any equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20623 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578297 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Veronica Guerrieri,Robert Shimer. Markets with Multidimensional Private Information. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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