G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20624
来源IDWorking Paper 20624
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
Paul Carrillo; Dina Pomeranz; Monica Singhal
发表日期2014-10-27
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in developing countries. A growing literature has argued that the ability to verify taxpayer self-reports against reports from third parties is critical for modern tax enforcement and the growth of state capacity. However, there may be limits to the effectiveness of third-party information if taxpayers can make offsetting adjustments on less verifiable margins. We present a simple framework to demonstrate the conditions under which this will occur and provide strong empirical evidence for such behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in Ecuador. We find that when firms are notified by the tax authority about detected revenue discrepancies on previously filed corporate income tax returns, they increase reported revenues, matching the third-party estimate when provided. Firms also increase reported costs by 96 cents for every dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in total tax collection.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20624
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578298
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paul Carrillo,Dina Pomeranz,Monica Singhal. Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement. 2014.
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