| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w20633
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20633
|
| Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment |
| Mikhail Golosov; Luigi Iovino
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-03
|
| 出版年 | 2014
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting to the worst perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We construct a recursive problem that characterizes the resource allocation and information revelation on the Pareto frontier of the set of PBE. We prove a version of the Revelation Principle and find an upper bound on the maximum number of messages that are needed to achieve the optimal allocation. Agents play mixed strategies over that message set to limit the amount of information transmitted to the government. The central feature of the optimal contract is that agents who enter the period with low implicitly-promised lifetime utilities reveal no information to the government and receive no insurance against current period shock, while agents with high promised utilities reveal precise information about their current shock and receive insurance as in economies with full commitment by the government. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Economics of Information
; Macroeconomics
; Fiscal Policy
; Public Economics
; Taxation
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20633
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578308
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Mikhail Golosov,Luigi Iovino. Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment. 2014.
|
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