| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20641 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20641 |
| \u201cNash-in-Nash\u201d Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work | |
| Allan Collard-Wexler; Gautam Gowrisankaran; Robin S. Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms’ marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to “Nash-in-Nash prices”—i.e., each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20641 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578316 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Allan Collard-Wexler,Gautam Gowrisankaran,Robin S. Lee. \u201cNash-in-Nash\u201d Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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