| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w20643
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 20643
|
| Optimal Fiscal Limits |
| Stephen Coate
|
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-03
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| 出版年 | 2014
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| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the optimal design of fiscal limits in the context of a simple political economy model. The model features a single politician and a representative voter. The politician is responsible for choosing the level of public spending for the voter but may be biased in favor of spending. The voter sets a spending limit and requires that the politician have voter approval to exceed it. This limit must be set before the voter's preferences for public spending are fully known. The paper first solves for the optimal limit and explains how it depends upon the degree of politician bias and the nature of the uncertainty concerning the voter's preferred spending level. A dynamic version of the model is then analyzed and policies which limit the rate of growth of spending are shown to dominate those that cap spending to be below some fixed fraction of community income. |
| 主题 | Subnational Fiscal Issues
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20643
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578318
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Stephen Coate. Optimal Fiscal Limits. 2014.
|
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