| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20650 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20650 |
| Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility | |
| Antoine Camous; Russell Cooper | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The valuation of government debt is subject to strategic uncertainty, stemming from investors' sentiments. Pessimistic lenders, fearing default, bid down the price of debt. This leaves a government with a higher debt burden, increasing the likelihood of default and thus confirming the pessimism of lenders. This paper studies the interaction of monetary policy and debt fragility. It asks: do monetary interventions mitigate debt fragility? The answer depends in part on the nature of monetary policy, particularly the ability of the monetary authority to commit to future state contingent actions. With commitment to a state contingent policy, the monetary authority can indeed overcome strategic uncertainty. Under discretion, debt fragility remains unless reputation effects are sufficiently strong. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20650 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578325 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antoine Camous,Russell Cooper. Monetary Policy and Debt Fragility. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Antoine Camous]的文章 |
| [Russell Cooper]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Antoine Camous]的文章 |
| [Russell Cooper]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Antoine Camous]的文章 |
| [Russell Cooper]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
