| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20669 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20669 |
| Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality | |
| Attila Ambrus; Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Matt Elliott | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-10 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies costly network formation in the context of risk sharing. Neighboring agents negotiate agreements as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which results in the social surplus being allocated according to the Myerson value. We uncover two types of inefficiency: overinvestment in social relationships within group (e.g., caste, ethnicity), but underinvestment across group. We find a novel tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Both within and across groups, inefficiencies are minimized by increasing social inequality, which results in financial inequality and increasing the centrality of the most central agents. Evidence from 75 Indian village networks is congruent with our model. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Other ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20669 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578343 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Attila Ambrus,Arun G. Chandrasekhar,Matt Elliott. Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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