| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20672 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20672 |
| Raising Revenue by Limiting Tax Expenditures | |
| Martin S. Feldstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-11-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Limiting tax expenditures can raise revenue without increasing marginal tax rates. Such a policy is equivalent to reducing government spending now done as subsidies through the tax code for a wide range of household spending and income. This paper explores one way of limiting tax expenditures: a cap on the total reduction in tax liabilities that each individual can achieve by the use of deductions and exclusions. The analysis describes the revenue effects and the distributional consequences of such a cap, and examines the sensitivity of these results to various design features. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20672 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578346 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin S. Feldstein. Raising Revenue by Limiting Tax Expenditures. 2014. |
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