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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w20697 |
来源ID | Working Paper 20697 |
Revealing Malfeasance: How Local Media Facilitates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico | |
Horacio A. Larreguy; John Marshall; James M. Snyder, Jr. | |
发表日期 | 2014-11-24 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We estimate the effect of local media outlets on political accountability in Mexico, focusing on malfeasance by municipal mayors. We study federal grants earmarked for infrastructure projects targeting the poor, and leverage two sources of plausibly exogenous variation. First, we exploit variation in the timing of the release of municipal audit reports. Second, and moving beyond existing studies, we exploit variation in media exposure at the electoral precinct level. In particular, we compare neighboring precincts on the boundaries of media stations’ coverage areas to isolate the effects of an additional media station. We find that voters punish the party of malfeasant mayors, but only in electoral precincts covered by local media stations (which emit from within the precinct’s municipality). An additional local radio or television station reduces the vote share of an incumbent political party revealed to be corrupt by 1 percentage point, and reduces the vote share of an incumbent political party revealed to have diverted funds to projects not benefiting the poor by around 2 percentage points. We also show that these electoral sanctions persist: at the next election, the vote share of the current incumbent’s party continues to be reduced by a similar magnitude. The electoral costs of diverting resources away from the poor are especially large for the populist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party. However, we find no effect of media stations based in other municipalities. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20697 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578371 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Horacio A. Larreguy,John Marshall,James M. Snyder, Jr.. Revealing Malfeasance: How Local Media Facilitates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico. 2014. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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