| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20747 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20747 |
| A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation | |
| Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-15 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is—implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20747 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578422 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Shavell. A Simple Model of Optimal Deterrence and Incapacitation. 2014. |
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