| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20774 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20774 |
| College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea | |
| Christopher Avery; Soohyung Lee; Alvin E. Roth | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20774 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578449 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Avery,Soohyung Lee,Alvin E. Roth. College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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