G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20775
来源IDWorking Paper 20775
Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism
Nikhil Agarwal; Paulo Somaini
发表日期2014-12-22
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms. We show that preferences are non-parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter. We then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to Cambridge. Estimates suggest that while 82% of students are assigned to their stated first choice, only 72% are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools. Assuming that students behave optimally, the Immediate Acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0.08 miles. The estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased, and reversed if students report truthfully.
主题Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20775
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578450
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Nikhil Agarwal,Paulo Somaini. Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a school choice mechanism. 2014.
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