G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20818
来源IDWorking Paper 20818
Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage
Vilsa Curto; Liran Einav; Jonathan Levin; Jay Bhattacharya
发表日期2015-01-05
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We estimate the economic surplus created by Medicare Advantage under its reformed competitive bidding rules. We use data on the universe of Medicare beneficiaries, and develop a model of plan bidding that accounts for both market power and risk selection. We find that private plans have costs around 12% below fee-for-service costs, and generate around $50 dollars in surplus on average per enrollee-month, after accounting for the disutility due to enrollees having more limited choice of providers. Taxpayers provide a large additional subsidy, and insurers capture most of the private gains. We use the model to evaluate possible program changes.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Nonprofits ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20818
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578491
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GB/T 7714
Vilsa Curto,Liran Einav,Jonathan Levin,et al. Can Health Insurance Competition Work? Evidence from Medicare Advantage. 2015.
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