| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20883 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20883 |
| Pareto Efficiency and Identity | |
| Christopher Phelan; Aldo Rustichini | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-01-26 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Inherent in the definition of Pareto efficiency is the idea that, in dynamic environments, an individual is indexed by the history of events up to his birth (rather than, as usual, the date of birth). Here, we explore the implications of this natural formulation. The set of Pareto efficient allocations that is consistent with this view is potentially larger than those considered so far in the literature. We show that the set of allocations is strictly larger because we do not require individuals to have insurance motives of the Harsanyi-Rawls type regarding risks on their own type realization. We do, however, maintain the insurance motives of parents toward their children. Even in our more general framework, efficiency criteria impose substantial restrictions on the set of allocations. Interestingly, the restrictions are of a new nature. Our different, more natural view has some important policy implications. The first is that some policy criteria (for example, the progressive nature of taxes) cannot be defended on efficiency grounds, once the Harsanyi-Rawlsian insurance criterion is rejected as being normatively unsound. Second, we show that the condition of imposing no taxes of any kind, coupled with each agent owning his own production, results in a Pareto efficient allocation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20883 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578558 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Phelan,Aldo Rustichini. Pareto Efficiency and Identity. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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